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INTRODUCTION 
"It is essential that employers and wage and salary 
earners, who together further the development of 
firms, should share the reward of their joint 
efforts ... Progress, which is achieved by all, 
must be a source of greater wealth for all, which 
means that all must take a share in the increase 
of capital thus produced." (1) 
To some, employees have a fundamental right to share in the 
profits of a business which they have helped to produce. 
"It is an expression not of economic or political theory but 
of practical morality" (2) Advocates of profit-sharing 
maintain that theirs is a philosophy which does not recognise 
artificial divisions between men. Labour is not a commodity, 
it is people; every man therefore has a human right to 
participate in the increased prosperity to which he has 
contributed through the teamwork of the company (3). 
Yet despite a philosophy which is both appealing and 
idealistic "profit-sharing" ( 4) is not widespread in industrial 
(1) Report to the President of the French Republic, preceding 
the Ordinance No. 67-693 of 17 August 1967 on the 
Participation of Salary and Wage Earners in the fruits of 
expansion of enterprises. This legislation will be referred 
to as "the Ordinance". Journal Officiel 18 August 1967 pp. 
8288-9. The writer's translation from the French. 
(2) Council of Profit Sharing Industries, Profit-Sharing Manual 
Edwards Bros. Michigan, 1949, pp.3-4. 
( 3) ibid pp. 3-4 
(4) As defined later in this paper, see pp. 6-8 
2876?.2 
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countries (5). Few governments in the world have legislated 
to encourage or to require the implementation of profit-
s h ar i n g ( 6 ) • 
France had legislation for compulsory profit-sharing in 
workers' productive co-operative societies as early as 1915. 
Since that time France has made numerous legislative provisions 
relating to profit-sharing, particularly after the post World 
War II nationalisation of a number of industries. The 
culmination of these measures was the French Government's 
Ordinance of 17 August 1967 which for the first time made worker 
participation in the profits of expansion a recognised right 
and not just an optional measure to be implemented at the 
employer's discretion. 
The Republic of Venezuela issued a decree in 1939 making 
profit-sharing compulsory throughout all industry and business. 
A number of other South American countries - Chile, Bolivia, 
Ecuador, Peru, Argentina and Columbia have made profit-sharing 
compulsory by law (7). Various socialist countries such as 
Czekos~ovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia have compulsory 
(5) For a brief history of profit-sharing see under the 
reference "Profit-Sharing" in Encyclopaedia Britannica, 
Vol. 18 pp.600-3. 
(6) See N.Z. Department of Labour Profit Sharing, a supplement 
to the Department's 1949 Report on Incentive Payment 
Schemes in New Zealand. 
(7) Westaway & Jacobs: Profit-Sharing Experience in Australia 
and Overseas. Personnel Practice Bulletin Vol. XV, 
No. 1. (1959)pp.27-28 
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schemes whereby employees benefit from profits of enterprises 
in addition to basic wages (8). The Supreme Court of India, 
has held that a demand for a bonus can be justified when wages 
fall short of the living standard or when industry makes "huge" 
profits part of which is due to employees' contributions to 
increased production (9). 
Profit-sharing only began to assume major proportions in 
the United States after 1942 when the Internal Revenue Code 
provided that employers' contributions to profit-sharing funds 
collected and disbursed as specified in the Code were deductible 
expenses for purposes of taxation (10). 
New Zealand was one of the first countries in which 
legislation has been enacted designed to remove existing laws 
which hindered the adoption of profit-sharing schemes. The 
Companies Empowering Act 1924 (11) provided for the issue of 
"labour shares" and enabled a company to issue non-transferable 
shares, which have no nominal or capital value, to its workers 
without requiring capital contribution on their part. Similar 
legislation has been passed in New South Wales (12). 
(8) ibid p.28. 
(9) ibid p.28; see also Some Papers on Wage Policy, Government 
of India, Ministry of Labour and Employment 1957. 
(10) See reference No. 5,p.602 · 
(11) Subsequently embodied in s.59 Companies Act 1933, and 
now s.67 Companies Act 1955. 
(12) This measure was introduced by an amendment to the 
New South Wales Companies Act 1936. 
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This paper aims firstly to examine the existing profit-
sharing legislation in New Zealand and to evaluate whether it 
has been successful in achieving the goals for which it was 
introduced. Then the 1967 French legislation on profit-sharing 
will be examined with a view to determining whether it offers 
any useful ideas for this country. The French scheme is of 
vital importance to any inquiry on profit-sharing as it 
represents the most recent and indeed the first instance of 
compulsory profit-sharing in a major industrial country. 
inquiry will be followed by a general discussion as to what 
benefits can reasonably be expected from legislation which 
either makes profit-sharing obligatory or offers incentives 
for firms to initiate profit-sharing scherres. 
The paper is divided into five parts: 
1. A definition of profit-sharing 
2. An evaluation of the profit-sharing legislation in 
New Zealand, namely s.67 Companies Act 1955. 
3. An outline of the 1967 French Government Scheme for 
profit-sharing and comments on the interpretation and 
application of its provisions (13). 
This 
4. A commentary on benefits which may be eXPected to result 
from profit-sharing legislation. 
(13) It is still relatively soon to assess the success of the 
French scheme from its results in France since it only 
came into force on 17 August 1967. 
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5. In conclusion the methods by which profit-sharing 
reform could be implemented in New Zealand are 
considered, with particular reference to the 
experience gained in this field overseas which was 
discussed in the earlier parts of the paper. 
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PART 1: DEFINITION OF PROFIT-SHARING 
In this paper the definition of the Renort on Profit-Sharing 
and Labour Co-partnership in the United Kingdom prepared by the 
Ministry of Labour (14) has been adopted. "Profit-sharing", 
according to the Report, applies to those cases in which: 
II an employer agrees with his employees that they 
shall receive, in partial remuneration of their labour, 
and in addition to their wages, a share, fixed before-
hand, in the profits realised by the undertaking to 
which the profit-sharing scheme relates. " ( 15) 
The relevant agreement between employers and employees 
should normally be binding in law, though an agreement which 
has only a moral obligation is sufficient provided that it is 
honourably carried out. (16 ) 
By a "share" in profits is rreant a sum paid to an employee; 
in addition to his wages, out of the profits, the amount of 
which is dependent on the amount of these profits (17). 
"Profits" a share in which under a profit-sharing scheme 
is allotted to the employees, are the actual net balance of gain 
(14) 1920 Cmd 544; Harper, Profit-Sharing in Practice and 
Law, Sweet & Maxwel1 195~ p.3 uses this definition. 
(15) ibid p.3. This definition is in the main identical 
with that formulated by the International Congress on 
Profit-Sharing held in Paris in 1889 and subsequently 
endorsed by the International Co-operative Congresses of 
1896 and 1897 and the International Congress on Profit-
Sharing in 1900. 
( 16 ) 19 2 0 Cmd 5 4 4 p . 3 . 
(17) ibid p.3. 
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realised by the financial operations of the undertaking in 
relation to which the scheme exists (18). This definition 
therefore excludes systems under which the amount of bonus 
depends on the quality or amount of the output or volume of 
business, irrespective of the rate of profit earned (19). 
The share must be "fixed in advance" to the extent that 
the employer cannot, at his discretion, determine the fraction 
of the profits which shall be shared with t h e employees (20). 
The Special Committee did not however consider it necessary 
that the employees should know all the details of the basis 
upon which the amount of their share is fixed. 
A profit-sharing distribution scheme may exclude persons 
who are not adults, or have not been in the service of the 
employer for some reasonable qualifying period, but must, in 
order to come within the definition of profit-sharing, include 
not less than 75 per cent of the total number of adult employees 
who have been in the service of the employer for at least one 
year ( 21) . A distribution which is confined to managers, foremen 
(18) For a summary of "What Profit-Sharing is Not" see B.L. 
Metzger Profit-Sharing in Perspective. Profit-sharing 
Research Foundation,2nd ed., Edwards Bros, Illinois, 1966. 
pp. 1-2. This work will be referred to as Metzger, 
Profit Sharing in Perspective. 
(19) e.g. bonus on output, commission on sales, premiums 
proportionate to savings effected in production. 
(20) 1920,Cmd 54t p.4. cf. the requirement for fullest possible 
disclosure under the 1967 French Ordinance. 
(21) ibid p.5. 
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and leading hands, or to any such classes of employees is not 
profit-sharing ( 22) . 
In this paper profit-sharing will include profit-sharing 
schemes with the characteristics defined above but with the 
additional feature that there is provision for the employees' 
shareholding in the company. Where such a scheme carries with it 
the ordinary rights and responsibilities of a shareholder then 
it is often described as a "co-partnership"; a principle which 
is well illustrated in s.67 of the Companies Act 1955. 
( 2 2 ) ib i d p . 5 . 
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PART II - PROFIT-SHARING LEGISLATION IN ~EW ZEALAND 
Labour Shares s.67 Companies Act 1955 
Section 67 of the Companies Act was first enacted in the 
Companies Empowering Act 1924. The present section sets up 
the machinery for an optional scheme whereby a company may issue 
labour shares to its employees. These shares have no nominal 
value and are not part of the company's capital yet in most 
other respects they put the holders in the same position as 
shareholders, including a right to attend and vote at share-
holders' meetings and to share in the profits of the company to 
the extent authorised by the memorandum or articles of the 
company. This share in the profits may, if authorised by the 
articles, be satisfied wholly or in part by the issue of capital 
shares. In the event of death retirement or cessation of 
employment the value of the shares which are non-transferable 
is computed in accordance with the articles and paid to the 
holder or his personal rep resentatives. 
Expectations 
Before inquiring into the success or otherwise of this 
legislation it is relevant to examine the expectations of the 
persons responsible for its enactment. The late Mr. Valder of 
Hamilton, who provided the original impetus for the legislation 
had two broad principles underlying his scheme. Firstly the 
fruits of extra effort and interest should go to those who 
contributed those elements. Capital was entitled to a fair 
return, including a sufficient compensation for risk, for 
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the contribution which it makes to the enterprise. However 
in Mr. Valder's view capital was not justifiably entitled 
to claim a further reward for contributions of a different 
nature not made by the persons subscribing the capital but 
by the efforts of the management and workers. A fully 
satisfactory relationship between labour and capital could not 
exist so long as the fruits of any extra effort and interest 
contributed by the workers and management were taken by those 
persons who had made no extra contribution to its realisation, 
namely the owners of the capital. 
Secondly the Valder scheme maintained that the workers 
must have a secure status. The periodical hand-out of a 
share of profits was not sufficient to establish the trust and 
a community of interest necessary to remove the discontents 
likely to arise from uncertainties, fears, suspicions and 
lack of knowledge. The scheme was therefore to give a permanent 
claim to the employee's reward through the holding of labour 
shares and representation on the Board of Directors by virtue 
of holding those shares (23). 
A brief look at New Zealand Parliamentary Debates during 
the passage of the Companies Empowering Bill through the House 
of Representatives and the Legislative Council provides 
a further indication of what the measure was intended to achieve. 
On the second reading of the Bill the Attorney-General the 
(23) N.Z. Labour Department, Profit Sharing (Supplement to a 
1949 Survey on Incentive Schemes} p.7. 
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Hon. Sir Francis Bell admitted that the proposal was experimental 
but that there was reason to believe it would have an influence 
in dissipating the separation of interests between capital and 
labour (2 4) . 
"It is a method and probably the only method, by which 
capital and labour can be brought together and united 
in a single endeavour to produce a profit which will 
show a return of the due interest and profit to capital 
and at the same time return profits as well as wages to 
the employees." (2 5) 
The theme of the prevailing ill-feeling and distrust between 
employers and employees was echoed in a number of speeches: 
11 
••• Some scheme must be adopted to bring about a better 
understanding between employer and employee ... labour 
should not be regarded merely as a cormnodity or article 
of commerce. That is what has caused the majority of 
our industrial strikes and disturbances. 11 (26) 
The Hon. Mr. Earnshaw was confident that the measure would result 
in "better production in the shops and a better spirit among 
the workers". (27) The Right Hon. Mr. Massey was equally 
optimistic: 
"There is no question that it (i.e. the Bill) will make 
for better relations between employees and employers, 
and that is what we want, particularly in connection 
with the secondary industries." (2 8) 
(24) N.Z. Parliamentary Debates Vol. 201 ~p.235-6; ibid Vol. 205 
pp. 800-811; pp.1097-1101 
(25) N.Z. Parliamentary Debates (1924) Vol. 205,p.801 
(26) ibid p.803 Hon. Earnshaw, 
(27) ibid p.803. 
(28) ibid p. 1098 on the third reading of the Bill 
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One of the reasons why Mr. Veitch, the member for Wanganui, 
approved the Bill was for its idealism; "Would to God that 
there was more idealism in this Parliament and less materialism" 
( 2 9) 
The Hon. Mr. MacGregor although considering that nothing 
could be more beneficial than giving workers an interest in 
the success and the control of the company in which they are 
employed was not sanguine as to the Bill's prospects of success. 
"Under present conditions it would be unsafe for any 
company, or any employer, however desirous they might 
be, to carry out the idea .... As things are, the 
result would be that some extremist would be certain 
to be appointed to the directorate - some man whose 
whole tendency and inclination would be to thwart any 
desire on the part of the directors to bring about 
amicable relations between the Company and its staff." ( 30) 
Mr. Isitt, the Member for Christchurch North dealt 
specifically with paragraph (d) of Clause 3 (31) which entitles 
holders of labour shares to attend and vote at shareholders' 
meetings and to share in the profits of the company. Speaking 
from his experience with retail companies he said: 
II the last thing you can do is to admit your employees 
into a full knowledge of the conduct of your business and 
give them a voice in the management of themselves." (32) 
(29) ibid p. 1098. 
(30) ibid p.808. 
(31) now s.67 (2}(d) Companies Act 1955. 
(32) N.Z. Parliamentary Debates (1924) Vol. 205 p.1100 . 
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He concluded that the Bill was not a workable or practical 
measure. 
Achievements 
How then have these expectations and warnings been fulfilled 
in the light of experience? The words of the member for Buller 
Mr. Holland, spoken in the third reading of the Bill give the 
most accurate prediction: 
" ... I do not think that this Bill is going to have any 
material effect ... for I hold that when it becomes law 
the ordinary course of events will proceed just as at 
present, without any revolutionary changes." (33) 
In a survey made by the Registrar of Companies in 1940 only 
eight companies had made some use of the labour shares provisions 
in the Companies Act (34). A 1949 Report on a sample of 
incentive payment schemes in New Zealand (35) prepared by the 
Department of Labour revealed only one instance of employee 
partnership under the Companies Empowering Act 1924, occurring 
in a firm in which the scheme had operated for 21 years. Northey 
in his text on New Zealand Company Law states: "It is understood 
that the power to issue labour shares has been availed of by 
II 
very few companies. ( 3 6) Even in the absence of more precise 
information it can confidently be asserted that s.67 of the 
Companies Act 1955 is a dead letter. 
(33) 
(34) 
ibid p. 109 8 
Profit Sharing (Supplement to 1949 Report by the Department 
of Labour on Incentive Schemes in New Zealand) p.8 
(35) p.37-8 ibid 
( 36) Introduction to Company Law 7th ed. 19GB 
p. 22 4 
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Why did s.67 and its predecessors meet with virtually no 
response from the management and workers of New Zealand c
ompanies? 
The first and most obvious reason for its desuetude was t
hat it 
was simply an optional measure which firms were free to a
dopt 
or ignore. 
"(l) Subject to the provisions of this section, a company
 
may, unless expressly prohibited from so doing by its 
memorandum, issue special shares (in this section 
referred to as labour shares) to persons for the time 
being employed in the service of the company." 
In this regard the lack of interest shown by workers, emp
loyers 
and shareholders to the initial French Ordinance of 7 Jan
uary 
1959 is noteworth137) This Ordinance introduced a numbe
r of 
tax and social exemptions for firms that would initiate p
rofit-
sharing schemes in some form for the benefit of their wor
kers. 
The lesson to be drawn from both s.67 and the Ordinance o
f 7 
August 1959 would appear to be that there is a certain 
reluctance on all sides to change the status quo, unless 
one is 
given a positive incentive or is compelled to do so. 
Yet the New Zealand legislation on profit-sharing has nev
er 
been reinforced with positive incentives for the initiatio
n of 
profit-sharing schemes. If anything the New Zealand tax 
structure penalises many schemes envisaged under s.67. 
The Land and Income Tax Act 1954 s.88(1) includes in the 
assessable income of any person: 
(37) George Lasserre, La Participation des Salaries 
Revue d'Economie ~olitique (1968) pp.70-71. 
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(b) All salaries, wages, or allowances (whether in cash 
or otherwise), including all sums received or 
receivable by way of bonus, gratuity, extra salary, 
or emolument of any kind, in respect of or in 
relation to the employment or service of the 
taxpayer. 
(c) All interest, dividends ... 
It is submitted that this provision would clearly cover 
any profit sharing scheme as defined in Part 1 of this paper 
and also any scheme under s.67 of the Companies Act. 
S.88C inserted by s.14(1) of the Land and Income Tax 
Amendment Act (No. 2) 1968 adds a further disincentive for 
profit-sharing in the form of employee shareholding. This 
section extends the meaning of II allowances II in s. 8 8 ( 1) (b) to 
include any benefit conferred on any taxpayer in respect of his 
present or future employment or service, under any agreement 
to sell or issue shares in any company to the taxpayer. 
Subsection (2) of s.88C sets out the four circumstances in which 
the assessable benefit is to be determined and when the benefit 
is to be assessed for income tax. The most unfavourable 
circumstances from the point of view of employee shareholding is 
subsection (2) (a) which provides that the amount of the 
benefit to the taxpayer who has acquired shares under an agreement 
shall be the amount by which the value of the shares on the date 
on which he acquired them exceeds the amount paid or to be paid 
for them. This benefit is deemed to have teen received by him 
in the income year in which he acquired the shares. The effect 
of this provision is that an employee may be assessable for tax 
on a benefit, namely shares in the employer company, which he has 
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not received in terms of cash payment and which may not be able 
to dispose of for a number of years depending on the terms of the 
agreement under which he acquired the benefit. When valuing the 
benefit the commissioner is required to take no account of any 
restrictive provision in the option agreement as to the alienation 
or transfer of any shares unless those provisions apply for a 
period of not less than eight years. For example, if the option 
agreement provided that the taxpayer could not sell or otherwise 
dispose of the shares under the agreement for a period of five 
years this restriction would be ignored in valuing the shares. 
Thus the employee in this example would be assessable for income 
tax on the entire value of the benefit to him although he will 
receive no cash benefit for a period of five years. 
Thus the New Zealand taxation laws which relate to profit-
sharing reveal that at best profit-sharing schemes are accorded 
no tax incentives whatsoever and in the case of employee share-
holdings there are positive disincentives. 
Yet perhaps the most important indications as to why the 
Companies Empowering Act has never been used to any significant 
extent can be discerned from the Parliamentary Debates on the Bill. 
A common theme in the Debates was the inherent hostility and 
distrust between employers and workers who were "divided 
into two antagonistic camps" 
conjecture that the Unions may 
(38) N.Z. Parliamentary Debates 
Hon. Mr MacGregor . 
(38). There is room for 
(1924) Vol. 205.p.807 
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have opposed profit-sharing on the grounds that it was a ploy 
to divert the loyalty of their members from the Unions to the 
employer. Also as profit-sharing schemes are usually introduced 
at the initiative of the employer the workers receive benefits 
which the unions have not won for them. Traditionally the unions 
have been most .interested in securing permanent increases in 
wage rates for all their members rather than obtaining uncertain 
increases of payment for those groups of members who may be 
fortunate enough to be employed by prosperous firms (39). 
The New Zealand Labour Department on the results of its 
1948 survey concluded: 
"The reasons for its non-adoption lie on the one hand 
in the reluctance of capital to abdicate any portion 
of its sovereignity and on the other hand in the fear 
that capital will not be freely invested for a limited 
reward. In both directions these fears are, it is 
contended, misplaced, .. " ( 40) 
(39) See Profit Sharing. A Study of the Results of Overseas 
Experience Department of Labour. Commonwealth of 
Australia, 1947,p.17. 
( 40) See reference no. ( 34) p. 8. 
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PART III: THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT'S PROFIT SHARING LEGISLATION 
The profit-sharing legislation introduced by the French 
Government by the Ordinance of 17 August 1967 represents not only 
the most recent but also the first instance of a system of 
compulsory profit-sharing in a major industrial country. The 
reform is based on four fundamental principles. 
A. PRINCIPLES OF THE REFORM (41) 
1. Profit-sharing becomes a recognised right. For the first 
time worker participation in the fruits of expansion is 
recognised as a right, since the system is compulsory, at least 
for the enterprises which have the characteristics defined by 
the Ordinance. An earlier Ordinance of 7 January 1959 which was 
optional in character had introduced certain tax and social 
security exemptions for firms that would initiate profit-sharing 
schemes. 
2 • 
"This met with little response, and only about 300 
firms acted on it. The proposal had a lukewarm 
reception from employers and shareholders alike 
and aroused many fears. Moreover the workers 
themselves did not seem to be in favour of the 
measure " ( 42) 
The proceeds of the employee's share must be saved. The 
amounts appropriated to the employees represent the salary and 
wage earner's share in t~e formation of capital within the firm. 
(41) The following principles have been extracted and 
translated from: Ministere de l' Economie et des Finances, 
La Participation des Salaries aux Fruits de l'Expansion 
des Entreprises, Service de l'Inforrnation,No. 12.67.3. 
(42) French Worker Participation in Profits French Embassy 
Press and Information Service No.B/57/4/70, p.l. 
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For this reason it was deemed appropriate that there should in 
general be a five year period of inalienability during which 
salary and wage earners can neither sell nor transfer their rights. 
3 __ . _ T_h_e_s_,,y'--s_t_e_m_o_f_,,_p_r_o_f_1_· t_-_s_h_a_r_1_· _n~g,__s_h_o_u_l_d_r_e_s_u_l_t _ f_r_o_m_a_n __ a~g,!...r_e=-e-=--m-=e_n-=-t 
between the parties. The head of the firm and employees should 
be in agreement on the determination of the nature, method of 
management and the administration itself of the rights instituted 
by the Ordinance. The institutional framework and the content of 
agreements may be the object of an extremely wide number of 
choices. Firms whose management and employees reach an agreement 
for a profit-sharing system which employs different methods from 
those defined in the Ordinance (43) may submit such agreement 
to the C.E.R.C. (44) for confirmation. 
4. The procedures are based on dialogue. In a more general 
fashion the Ordinance aims to create a greater participation by 
employees in the results of the firm. This consideration is not 
only true for financial matters because the reform also 
anticipates the development of a social dialogue within the 
enterprise between workers and management. 
B. THE EXTENT OF THE REFORM 
1. An improvement in the overa~l remuneration of workers. The 
level of the supplementary remuneration varies greatly from 
one enterprise to another; in certain firms, running at a loss 
( 4 3) "accords dtrogatoires": 
196 7 
see Article 5, Ordinance 17 August 
(44) Centre d'Etudes des Revenus et des Couts. The somposition 
and functions of this body are described later at pp 26-27 
of this paper. 
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or low profit there may be no profit to share for a number of 
years; in others the employees'share may amount to 4, 5 or 
even 6% of the annual total of salaries (45). However the 
Ordinance is in no way intended to create a system of direct 
remuneration or to have any influence on wages (46). 
2. A more active participation by workers in the life of firms. 
Participation although not intended to alter the responsibilities 
of the head of the firm should strengthen the right of employees 
to information and to discussion of such information with 
management. This is intended to ere ate an active personal 
interest in workers in their firms progress. 
3. The promotion of investments. A firm is not taxed on 
profits which it allocates for productive investments provided 
that this amount does not exceed the amount allocated as the 
employees' shares in profits for that year. This tax saving is 
intended to encourage an increase in self-financing and capital 
investment by firm. 
4. The developrren t of savings. One of the goals of the reform 
is to develop a savings habit among employees. The legislators 
considered that the five year period of unavailability of the 
employees' funds should develop in workers a taste for stable 
savings over a period of time. To this end, when profit-sharing 
(45) See the Table on page 25 of this Paper. 
(46) See notes du Ministere du Travail, No. 4, 25-31 Janvier 1971 
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was introduced the Government created the machinery for company 
savings plans, which are intended to absorb any funds released 
under profit-sharing schemes. 
SCOPE OF PARTICIPATION 
Article 1 of the Ordinance of 17 August 1967 provides that 
every firm (47) which usually employs more than 100 employees 
whatever the nature of its activity and whatever its legal 
form, is required to comply with the provisions of the Ordinance 
which guarantees the right of employees to participate in the 
fruits of the expansion of the firm. For firms employing less 
than 100 persons the scheme is optional, but if they choose 
to comply then they will automatically receive the benefits 
provided in the Ordinance (48). 
Although in principle the Ordinance applies to all 
enterprises with more than 100 employees certain special 
provisions have been found necessary for national corporations 
to which the concepts of "profit" and "company capital II have 
no real meaning. Thus corporations whose main purpose is to 
provide a public service and whose prices and expenditure are 
controlled cannot make a 11 profi t II in the conventional use of the 
term. Others operating in the competitive sector which have the 
freedom to control their prices and general method of operations, 
must subject to their special features follow a system similar 
( 4 7) In this Paper the word "firm" is intended as a generic term 
to include all the various legal forms of business 
covered by the Ordinance. 
(48) Ordinance 17 August 1967; Article 14. 
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to profit-sharing as laid down in the Ordinan ce . Between t tese 
two types of national corporations is a whole range of 
enterprises for which special rules are required (49). 
THE WORKERS' SPECIAL PARTICIPATION RESERVE FUND 
Article 2 provides that each year a special worker 
participation reserve is to be for:rred by setting aside a portion 
of the profits, realised in :rretroplitan France or its overseas 
depart:rrents. This amount is calculated on the basis of the 
firm's taxable profits (net of depreciation). From this sum 
tax ( corporate or personal depending on how the firm is owned) 
is first deducted and then a further deduction is made of 5% 
on the firm's capital (including reinvested capital) employed 
in the business, as determined by the tax inspector. 
The workers' special participation reserve is equal to 
half the figure obtained by multiplying the balance by the 
fraction of total salaries over the added value (50) of the 
(49) The legislation providing for shareholding by workers 
in the nationalised Renault Car Company is a good illus-
tration of the adaption of the ordinary rules for profit-
sharing to an enterprise with special characteristics; 
see Loi no. 70-11 du 2 Janvier 1970 relative a la Regie 
nationale des Usines Renault; Journal Officiel, 4 Janvier, 
1970, p.145. See also notes et Etudes Documentaires, 
L'Actionnariat des Salari~s, La docu:rrentation Fran<s=aise, 
Paris, 1972 pp.51-54. This will be referred to as 
h'Actionnaria~ des · Salaries. 
(50) The "added value" is the total economic result realised 
in the firm's production for that year. 
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enterprise (51). The other half belongs to the shareholders. 
The legal formula is written as follows: 
RSP = (B SC 
TI5o 
s 
VA 
X 
1 
~ ( 5 2) 
Article 3 provides that each worker's share of the reserve 
is calculated proportionally to the salary received within the 
maximum limits set by decree. The implementing orders provide 
on the one hand, the monthly pay figure taken into consideration in 
calculating the distribution of the reserve is limited to 4,650F; 
on the other, the amount distributed to any one person may not 
exceed 6,840F a year (53). It follows that the highly paid senior 
and management staffs will not benefit in proportion to their 
salaries. 
(51) "This formula is used to avoid an unearned increment to 
employees of heavily capitalised firms. A simple division 
of the "super-profit" (the balance) between shareholders 
and employees, without allowing for different degrees of 
capitalisation, would yield a much higher benefit to 
employees of, for example, oil firms than to those of 
firms where labour constitutes a large part of the costs." 
PEP (Political and Economic Planning) Vol.XXXIII No. 500 
October 1967, Appendix to Chapter II. 
(52) RSP = Workers special participation reserve; B = net 
profit (after tax and 5% interest on capital); S = Salaries; 
VA= added value. 
N.B. Georges Lasserre, Professor of Law, University of Paris, 
La Partici ation des Salaries aux Fruits de L'Expansion des 
Entrepr1ses, Revue Econom1e Po 1t1que p. 
criticises this formula, inter alia, for the reason that the 
use of a net profit is an artificial concept more likely to 
hinder workers than to assist them in acquiring a better 
understanding as to the operations of their firm. 
(53) Lasserre La Participation p.78. As at August 1972 one 
N.Z. dollar is equivalent to about six French Francs. 
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The financial results obtained by employees in 1968 by 
virtue of the new legislation are shown in the following table 
prepared by the Interministerial Denartment of Worker 
Participation and Interest ( 5 4). In the first year of its 
operation of some three million employees covered.by the system, 
more than two thirds have been able, by virtue of the results 
of their firms, to have a share of t h e p rofits allocated to them. 
TAXATION ADVANTAGES FOR FIRMS 
The amount distributed to e mp loyee s ' special participation 
reserve in each year is deductible from that year's taxable 
profit (55). Since the company tax rate is 50% the firm will 
save on taxation one half of what it pays into the employees' 
participation reserve fund. 
A second benefit for firms is that they can make tax-free 
provision for investments to an amount b eing equal to that of the 
participation reserve fund. This results in a further tax 
saving of 50 % on the amount of the reserve. The reason given by 
the French Government for these substantial tax concessions is 
firstly to avert the danger that profit-sharing may lead firms 
to reduce their self-financing margins and secondly to encourage 
the retention of part of the profits for productive investment 
and capital expansion (56). 
(54) Centre d'Etudes des Revenus et des Couts, La Participation 
des Salari~s aux Fruits de 1Expansion. La Documentation 
Fran9aise, Paris, 1971. Table 15 p.20. This text will 
be referred to as "C.E.R.C. La Participation" 
(55) Article P, Ordinance 17 August, 1967 
(56) French Worker Participation in Profit Sharing. French 
Embassy Press and Information Service p.7. For a criticisr 
of these tax concessions on the grounds that they amount o a 
subsidv.or qitt to firms oaid for by the taxpayer see Lasserre 
La ~articin tion .80-86. 
Nature of Industry 
or Commerce 
Extraction - power 
Metals and mechanic 
Public works and 
construction materials 
Chemistry and rubber 
industry 
Textile clothing leather 
Food wood paper 
Transport and commerce 
Banks and other services 
Total of the sectors 
No. of employees 
covered by an 
agreement 
54,509 
842,057 
442,815 
193,111 
248,664 
358,106 
524,214 
279,778 
2,943,254 
RESULTS OF PARTICIPATION (1968) 
No. of 
employees 
having 
benefited 
from the 
distribution 
42,750 
574,884 
291,182 
165,201 
156,363 
227,729 
418,851 
267,5()6 
2,167,918 
Total of the 
sums dis-
tributed 
( in Francs) 
16,424,000 
211,627 ,OOO 
64,661,000 
92,609,000 
46,184,000 
118,941,000 
120,622,000 
94,485,000 
763,553,000 
Importance of 
participation 
in re 1 at ion to 
salaries ( % ) 
2.2 
2. 8 
1.7 
4.1 
3.2 
3.4 
2. 3 
2.4 
2.7 
Importance of 
p arti cipati on 
in relation to 
net profit 
6.3 
14.4 
14.4 
14.4 
16. 4 
14.4 
13.1 
9.8 
13.2 
Total 
parti cip ati on 
per employee 
( in Francs) 
32 4 
386 
222 
561 
295 
42 8 
2 88 
353 
353 
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TAXATION ADVANTAGES FOR EMPLOYEES 
The amounts credited to employees by virtue of the partic-
ipation are not assessable for personal income tax provided that 
the principle of the unavailability of these sums during a period 
of five years is respected. It follows that at the time when 
monies or securities are credited to an employee if he has an 
immediate right to dispose of them then they are assessable for 
income tax. 
AGREEMENTS IN DIFFERENT TERMS FROM THE ORDINANCE (ACCORDS 
DEROGATOIRES) 
Article 5 of the Ordinance provides that the participation 
agreements can depart from certain aspects of the normal system 
as set out in the other Articles (known as "accords derogatoires") 
on condition that such changes be approved. The same Article 
with certain reservations, allows firms which had already imple-
mented a participation scheme before 17 August 1967 to maintain 
that scheme in force until 1 January 1970. Of the 5,772 agreements 
in existence at 31 December 1970, 1,869 (32.4%) contained cond-
itions which derogated from the provisions of the Ordinance and 
thereby came before the supervision of the C.E.R.C. (57) The 
alterations most frequently introduced by the signatories concerned 
the method of calculation of the special participation reserve 
(59% of the employees concerned by the accords derogatoires), the 
length of service of the employee to determine the beneficiaries 
of the participation (53%), the methods of sharing the reserve 
between the beneficiaries (47%) and other derogations (27%) (57a) 
(57) Centre d 1 Etudes des Revenus et des Cofits. The Composition 
and functions of this body are described at pp 26-27 of this 
paper. 
(57a) C.E.R.C. La Participation pp.17-18 see also Artrl.es 3 and 4 
Ordinance 11 August 1967. 
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Where the parties wish to depart from the provisions of the 
Ordinance their agreement will not qualify for the tax benefits 
accorded to profit-sharing schemes until the Minister of Social 
Affairs has given his decision confirming the agreement. This 
decision is given on the recommendation of the C.E.R.C. and an 
unfavourable opinion from this body will prevent the confirmation 
of an agreement (58). 
The C.E.R.C. was created by a decree of the 18 April 1966. 
Its task is to assemble and put at the disposition of the 
Government and the other participants in France's economic and 
social life the necessary information on which to form a revenue 
policy for the French economy. To achieve this object it seeks 
to improve the basis and presentation of statistics relating 
to revenue, costs and prices. It analyses the growth of 
productivity in firms as well as the methods of sharing the 
benefits of such growth between the consumer, the workers, 
management and owners. 
The C.E.R.C., when it meets to examine the accords derogatoires 
under Article 5, comprises the President and the five rrembers of 
the Council of the C.E.R.C. plus two employer representatives 
and two employee representatives. The limited number of these 
representatives, two for each of the parties, in view of the 
multiplicity of the union organisations has lead to limiting the 
term of office of each representative to one year. In this way, 
the different organisations can turn by turn take part in the 
(58) ibid pp.28-29 
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C.E. R. C. All the members have speaking and voting rights. 
Article 21 of the decree of 19 Decefllber 1967 permits the 
Directors of several Government Departments to participate in 
the deliberations of the C.E.R.C. in an advisory capacity. These 
officials include the Director-General of Imports, the Director 
of the Treasury for the Minister of the Economy and Finance, the 
Director of Industrial Policy to the Minister of Scientific and 
Industrial development and the Director-General of Work and 
Employment. 
A representative of the General Confederation of Workers' 
Co-operative Companies takes part in the work of the C.E.R.C. 
in an advisory capacity when it is dealing with agreements 
concluded by such companies. A Government Commissioner charged 
with co-ordinating the opinions of the different departrrents and 
with presenting the Government's position delivers his observations, 
mos t often oral, on each of the oarticipation agreements which 
are submitted to him. 
Lastly a reporter (rapporteur) assisted where necessary by 
' special reporters, has the task of analysing and explaining to 
the C.E.R.C. the contents and any special characteristics of a 
particular agreement. The reporter in addition to explaining 
agreements also proposes his preliminary opinion on them to the 
C.E.R.C. (59) 
(59) The foregoing description of the organisation and methods 
of work of the C.E.R.C. is translated from C.E.R.C. La 
Participation, pp.27-34. 
CONDITIONS OF PRESENCE OR OF LENGTH OF SERVICE 
Article 3 of the Ordinance entitles those employees who 
have been at least three months with the enterprise during a 
financial year to participate in the profits of that year. 
The C.E.R.C., in examining agreements whose signatories 
sought to alter the length of qualifying service found that 
many employee representatives, managers and boards of directors 
held the view that an employee who has not belonged to a firm 
for more than three months is not really integrated. These 
people considered that it was somewhat absurd to confer rights 
locked up for 5 years to a person who is only passing through 
the firm and whom one will probably not be able to trace at 
the end of theperiod when the funds are made available (60). 
A number of the signatories asserted that employee 
participation assumes that one has shown a certain interest for 
the enterprise, a sort of attachment for the social group that 
it represents and its future development and that it was obvious 
that an employee of three months standing cannot be considered 
(60) M. Philippe De Chartre, Secretary of State to the Ministry 
of Labour, Employrnent and Population has raised the 
question whether the three month qualifying requirement 
in the Ordinance should be modified in view of the fact 
that a third of all accords derogatoires depart from the 
normal provisions of the Ordinance only in that they 
require a longer period of qualifying service. Bilan et 
perspectives de l'Ordonnance de 1967 sur la Participation des 
Salaries aux fruits de l'expansion des entreprises. Notes 
du Minist~re du Travail. No. 4. 25-31 Janvier 1971. 
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as demonstrating this interest or this attachment. 
A number of firms endeavoured to justify the derogation 
they sought on the grounds that in their industry the first 
months after the beginning of employment corresponds to a period 
of apprenticeship and that in these circumstances the employee 
does not really contribute to the firm until after six months 
or more. Others have emphasised the administrative expenses 
engendered by the necessity of sharing and of administering 
for five years sums due to salary and wage earners who have 
remained little more than three months with the enterprise. 
Till<ing into account the general spirit of the Ordinance, 
the C.E.R.C. decided on a rather strict position, approving 
only in exceptional cases clauses which reserved the participation 
in profits to those salary earners who had been with the 
enterprise for longer than the three months stated in Article 3. 
Thus it decided not to approve any agreement stipulating a period 
which was very much longer than three months; six months 
constituting the maximum derogation normally authorised by the 
C.E.R.C. (61) 
Arguments based on the necessity of facilitating "integration" 
of personnel and of encouraging "the spirit of perseverence" 
(61) See Case H.0017. Company B 22 April 1969. 
Application by porcelain manufacturing company for a 
12 month qualifying period before new employees could 
participate on the grounds that in their first year by 
virtue of the long training requirement they did not 
really contribute to the growth of the company. The 
C.E.R.C. declined to approve the application because it 
was not substantiated by sufficient evidence and it was a 
very significant deviation from the three month period 
mentioned in Article 3. 
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were also regarded as insufficient by the C.E.R.C. because the 
Ordinance of 17 August 1967 did not have for its object the 
encouragement of the stability of personnel but rather the 
allocation of a share in the fruits of the expansion to all 
employees who have contributed by their work to the realisation 
of a firm's expansion, whether or not they have been with it 
for a long time (62). 
THE DEFINITION OF BENEFICIARIES 
In the area of defining these employees who will benefit 
from the Ordinance the C.E.R.C. has been particularly strict 
since it did not wish to interfere with property ri ghts conferred 
upon employees by statute. The C.E.R.C. found that most agreements 
which endeavoured to restrict the number of workers who could 
participate in profits were inspired by perfectly legitimate 
motives and were often not only accepted but also formulated by 
the employees' representatives themselves. 
The guiding principle used by the C.E.R.C. in examining 
accords derogatoires was that of non-discrimination. "All the 
employees who have participated in the realisation of the fruits 
of expansion have a right, no matter what their legal title or 
position in the firm, to receive their share of the result" (63). 
(62) See Case H. 0118 - Company D , 27 January 1970. 
Application for one year seniority requirement refused. 
C.E.R.C. La Participation p.102. 
(63) C.E.R.C. La Participation p.91. 
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Thus agreements cannot exclude a section of the employees on 
the grounds that they are foreigners, seasonal workers (64), 
part-time workers (65), hourly (66), daily workers (67) or on 
the other hand people who occupy a very important position (6 8) 
in the firm. Although most of these categories except senior 
staff do not have a right to the same sums as the regular staff 
because the annual salary on which their share is based will vary 
greatly, no matter how trifling the amount to which they are 
entitled, they will still be classified as beneficiaries. 
Another problem in this area was the case of employees 
who had been subjected to disciplinary measures. The advocates 
of excluding such people from the benefits of participation was 
that they had shown absolutely no interest in the advancem€nt of 
the firm and indeed had sometimes directly impeded or damaged 
the business. However, the C.E.R.C. refused to become involved in 
t his delicate sphere because cert.ain faults which incur 
disciplinary measures nay not necessarily have prevented the 
( 6 4) Case H.0690 - Company p 26 May 19 70. C.E. R.C. 
La ParticiEation p.95 
( 6 5) Case H. 0 7 44 - Groupe B 26 May 19 70, C. E. R. C. La -Participation p.94. 
( 6 6) Case H. 0 342 Com)_)any G 28 April 19 70; ibid p.95 
( 6 7) Case H.0903. Company B 30 June 19 70. ibid p.95 
( 6 8) Case H.010 2. Company B 24 February 19 70. ibid p.99 
employee concerned from having contributed to the firm's 
progress. It is considered that since participation is a right 
granted by law, only a legal authority such as the Courts should 
be able to deprive an employee of this right. Only the Courts 
are competent to judge the substance and seriousness of the 
alleged faults. Thus in Case H.0222 S.A.R.L. B - 24 March 1970 
the C.E.R.C. held: 
"Article 2 of the Agreement provides that the enterprise 
committee will be able on a unanimous vote to exclude 
from the benefits of participation members of the staff who 
have been dismissed for serious or inexcusable faults. This 
clause is unacceptable with regard to the principle of the 
Ordinance according to which the participation is a right 
open to all employees who have contributed to the expansion 
of the firm for whi eh they work." ( 69) 
Other borderline cases presented to the C.E .R.C. concerned 
employ ees who were undergoing training, those who worked for the 
subsidiary of a parent company and those who worked in "extensions" 
of the firm such as on committees and social services. 
Lastly was the rather unusual situation where certain employees -
owners, and senior or highly paid management staff had voluntarily 
renounced their rights because they considered that they already 
Jenefitted sufficiently from the profits of the firm (70). 
( 6 9) C. E. R. C. La P arti ci p ati on p. 9 6 
(70) Case H.0102. Company B 24 February 1970,ibid p.99. 
held that such rights can be renounced but only by the 
individual concerned and such a decision can be reversed 
at the beginning of each new financial year. 
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THE WAYS IN WHICH THE RESERVE IS TO BE USED 
The nature and methods of administration of the employees' 
special reserve are to be decided by collective conventions or 
by agreements concluded with the most representative trade 
union organisations, or with the joint production committee (71). 
The reserve must be made over to the employees in one of 
the following three forms: ( 72) 
1. Allotment of shares in the firm (existing or newly created 
by capitalising reserves) : for this purpose firms will 
be perrni tted to buy their own shares. 
2. Payment of the sums waking up the special reserve into an 
investment fund with the allocation to each employ ee of a 
credit of his individual share of the total fund. These 
payments constitute debts of the firm such as debentures 
or blocked current accounts in ewployees' names. The 
sums involved must be reinvested in the firm through a 
fund to be agreed on. 
3. Shares or certificates in any investment company external 
to the firm, or payments into personal accounts opened 
within an approved firm savings plan. 
In the absence of agreement after a year from the closing 
of the financial year in which the employees rights commence 
for the first time, then on the certification of the labour 
inspector to this effect, the employees' reserve is taken in the 
(71) Articles 4 and 10 Ordinance 17 August 1967 . 
( 72) Article 4. 
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form of current accounts in the employees' names, i.e. alternative 
no. 2 above ( 73). These funds are blocked for a period of eight 
years instead of the normal period of five years which applies 
where agreement is reached. 
The most frequently chosen rrethod of eroploying the participatio 
reserve was that of blocked current accounts and in exceptional 
cases debentures, accounting for 56% of all agreeroents. Investment 
of funds outside the firm accounted for 41% and firm savings plans 
6% of agreements. Only 0.5% of agreerrents chose the allotment 
of company shares to employees (74). In the light of these 
figures the whole concept of employee shareholding (described 
earlier as co-partnership) and its function of involving workers 
in the progress of their employer companies was called in 
question. 
However, the French Governrrent has sought to encourage 
employee shareholding through special legislation. President 
Pompidou on 16 September 1969 made a general policy declaration 
that legislation relating to shareholding among all or any of 
the salaried staff of a company would be brought before 
Parliament in the 1970 autumn session. On 22 September 1969 
M. Pornpidou stated: (75) 
( 7 3) Article 11 
(74) These figures are taken from a publication of 10 March 
1972 referred to in this paper as L'Actionnariat des 
Salaries p. 47. 
(75) Statement made at a Press Conference on the announcement of 
the shareholding project for Renault workers. L' Actionnariat 
des Salaries p.47. 
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" worker shareholding ... is an old idea. It seems 
to me to be regaining strength. It seeks to involve 
the workers in the life of the company otherwise than 
by just variations in pay. It also constitutes at the 
same time an endeavour at achieving fairness, 
a training in responsibility; and this is why I believe 
that it should be encouraged ... This form of worker 
involvement is the most healthy economically and 
socially the most satisfying. (76) 
The new legislation for employee shareholding plans was 
introduced in the Law of the 31 December 1970 (77) and the 
Decree (78) of the 7 June 1971. The inspiration for the 
measures was derived to a significant extent from the "stock 
option plans employed with success in the anglo-saxon countries" 
(79). Although certain French enterprises had implemented such 
schemes in the past these were not only exceptional cases but 
also less extensive and less frequent than those practised in other 
countries, particularly in the United States. 
A Ministry of Finance Staterrent indicated that although the 
t ext did not limit the number of eventual beneficiaries it is 
probable that the legislation will be used rather as a rreans of 
involving the managerial and controlling staff, whereas the 
procedures of the 196 7 Ordinances were more particularly reserved 
( 76) ibid p.54 
( 77) Loi no. 70-1322 relative a l'ouverture d'options de 
SOUSCription OU d'achat d'actions au benefice du 
personnel des societ~s. Journal Officiel du 30 Janvier 
19 71. 
( 78) Decret no. 71-418 du 7 Juin 1971 
( 79) President Pompidou, 16 Se~tember 1969 quoted in 
L'Actionnariat des Salaries p. 47. 
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for the employees as a whole. By giving an additional motivation 
to the management staff the intention was to recruit and maintain 
good personnel and to reward them for the results of their 
competence and effectiveness ( 80). 
The reform (81) provides companies with the right to increase 
their authorised capital and offer the shares thereby created to 
the staff. The beneficiaries have a period of five years in 
which to exercise the option. Except for sorre general principles 
the law imposes no obligation on either the companies which 
give the options or the beneficiaries which receive them. All 
the employees are able to benefit from the option but the 
comoany has the right to limit the range of persons so entitled. 
In order to adapt the share option plan to the structure and 
objectives companies are permitted to make their own special 
rules such as the qualifying length of service and the period 
for which the shares must be kept. 
In principle no limit is placed on the employees right to 
resell his shares imrrediately after the exercise of the option, 
although the option agreements themselves may impose a minimum 
period during which the shares must be held. For taxation purposes 
the benefit corresponding to the difference between the market 
value of the share at the date of exercising the option and the 
( 80) 
( 81) 
L'Actionnariat des Salari~s. p.48 
The following two paragraphs are a very brief outline of 
some of the more important provisions of the Law of 
31 December 19 70. 
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price of the option constitutes additional salary. However, this 
benefit is exempted from income tax if the shares thus acquired 
are registered and the beneficiary undertakes not to dispose of 
them for a period of fiveyears from the date on which the option 
is exercised. 
FIVE YEAR PERIOD OF INALIENABILITY OF WORKERS ' SHARE IN THE PROFITS 
Exceptions to the Rule 
Article 6 of the Ordinance lays down that except as provided 
by decree the rights constituted for the benefit of the employees 
by virtue of the provisions of the present Ordinance cannot be 
negotiated or demanded until the expiration of 5 years starting 
from the conunencement of these rights. 
Exceptional cases provided by decree are the marriage, 
dismissal, retirement of the beneficiary or the disability, 
serious illness or death of the beneficiary or of the beneficiary's 
spouse (82). Another exception to the rule of unavailability is 
that firms are authorised to pay directly to salary and wage 
earners the sums due to them whe n these do not amount to 20 francs 
per pe rs on ( 8 3) . 
The rights of the salary and wage earners are immediately 
liquidated in cases of dismiss al but not of resignation ( 84). 
(82) Decret no. 67-1112 du 19 Decewbre 1967 - Article 16 
(83) Article 62-IV Loi No. 68.1172 du 27 Decembre 1968 
(84) Case H.0018 Company A - 24 June 1969; C.E.R.C. La 
Participation p.128 
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Revenues produced 
Whatever the method of administration used, the C.E.R.C. 
has held that the employees' credits in the special participation 
reserve must be income producing (85). Although there is no 
provision in the Ordinance which imposes such a principle the 
C.E.R.C. has taken into account three factors. Firstly, Article 
11 of the Ordinance which provides a rate of interest of 5% on 
employees' credits placed in the current accounts of the 
employer where the parties have failed to agree on the method of 
investment to be used. Secondly, because the employee is for-
bidden to dispose of the credits for a period of five years the 
legislator must for this reason have intended that these funds 
should be income producing since during this space of time no 
capital gain can be hoped for. Lastly it would not be fair that 
the enterprise and the shareholders should benefit by these methods 
of financing at no cost to themselves. 
The parties are free to agree on an appropriate rate of 
interest provided that this is not too low with reference to the 
current money market rates. As a general rule 5% has been 
considered by the C.E.R.C. to be the minimum rate. (86) 
Provided this minimum is observed the parties may fix a formula 
(85) See Case H.0189 - Company V 24 February 1970. C.E.R.C. La Participation p .140 where a clause in an agreement stipulating that "the parties acknowledge that the current accounts wi 11 not earn interest "was helcl to be contrary to one of the principles of the Ordinance. 
(86) See C.E.R.C. La Participation p.140. 
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for fixing the rate which varies from year to year, with 
reference for example to the official index or an index of 
rates agreed by the parties which follows the fluctuation of 
the money market. However, any such agreerrent must be decided 
and set out in a precise formula and if there is to be an annual 
variation this cannot be left to the unilateral decision of 
management (87). 
Information for the employees 
The collective and individual information to be given 
to employees whether there is an agreerrent or not must be at least 
the equivalent to that required under the Decree of 19 December 
19 6 7 ( 8 8) . 
(a) Collective information 
The staff are to be informed of the formula which has been 
used to calculate their rights in a financial year in which 
there has been a sharing of profits. This is done in accordance 
with the terms of the agreerrent between the parties or in 
default of such agreement by the posting of notices at the place 
of employrrent ( 89} . 
Within six months after the closinq of the financial year 
the employer must present to the delegates of the staff or 
(87) Case H.0384 Etablissement E., 28 April 1970,ibid p.140 
(88) Decret no. 67-1112 du 19 Decerobre 1967 - titre III Articles 
2 4-2 7. 
(89) ibid.Article 24. 
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other approved body a report which comprises: 
- the elements which serve as a basis of calculation of the 
total of the participation reserve for the last financial 
year 
- precise information on the administration and use of the 
sums appropriated to this reserve (90) 
(b) Individual information 
On every occasion in whi eh shares in profits are allotted 
amongst employees a card must be delivered to each beneficiary 
indicating 
the total amount of the participation reserve for the 
last financial year 
- the amount of the ri<Jhts attributed to the individual 
concerned 
- the rrethod of administration of the rights in cases where 
these have been entrusted to an organisation 
the date on which the rights may be demanded or transferred 
- the circumstances in which the rights can be liquidated 
or transferred before the expiration of the five year period. 
EVALUATION OF THE ORDINANCE 
Like any major reform affecting the interest of workers and 
employees the Ordinance of 17 August 1967 has attracted its share 
of controversy. Professor Lasserre (~1) is perhaps one of the 
(90) ibid,Article 25, 
(91) Georges Lasserre, Professor of Law and Economic Sciences 
at the University of Paris. 
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more outspoken critics of the measure. 
"The reform was imposed on the country when it had been 
wanted by almost nobody ... And yet, when t~e Ordinance 
appeared, it was evident that it completely failed to answer 
the great intentions expressed by the Head of State (92). 
It was a curious result of the obstinancy of a man who is 
not a si;:,ecialist in these questions and who sees them from 
a distance, and on the other hand of alarmist campaigns and 
pressure of big business ... which obtained an extraordinary 
metamorphasis of the reform in a supplementary financial 
advantage (93) for itself, without any sacrifice on its part." 
Lasserre criticises the scope of the reforw's application on 
the grounds that it will apply to less than half of the 4.9 million 
employees who work for firms employing more than 100 workers. 
he says would make approximately two million beneficiaries out 
of 13 million workers in commerce and industry (9 4) . He feels 
that the system created by the Ordinance is not a valid system 
This 
of worker participation and interest, capable of modifying t~e 
attitudes and behaviour of workers, to make them consciously 
stalwarts of the firm and to stimulate their zeal and their goodwill. 
The period of 5 or 8 years before the receipt of the benefit in a 
disposable form plus the extreme smallness of the benefit would 
s uf fi ce to deprive it of any efficacity. 
(92) i.e General de Gaulle. 
(93) Lasserre refers to the tax advantages given to firms under 
Article 8. See p. 24 of this paoer. 
(94) Lasserre La Participation p. 77. 
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Criticism is also made of the base on which the special 
workers' participation reserve is calculated (95) because it 
substitutes the actual profit for an artificial notion of "fiscal" 
profit. 
"The workers are therefore going to be placed in a 
situation, not of participation, but of oassive 
dependence, with regard to arbitrary figures, on which 
they can have practically no power". (96) 
Lasserre's most serious criticism is that the burden of 
meeting the tax exemptions granted to the firms falls upon the 
taxpayer: 
"It is no longer the firm which shares its enrichment 
with the workers in order to make them true associates: 
it keeps the benefit corrpletely for itself. It is 
the entire nation which gives the firms a subsidy, 
a gi ft • • • II ( 9 7 ) 
The legislation is further criticised on the grounds that 
its benefits go only to a small minority of workers, not on 
the grounds of their need or merit but simply to those who 
happen to work in the most profitable enterJ?rises. For those 
people the re form represents a small supplementary "private 
benefit". If the share going to this minority of workers remains 
as insignificant as it appears it will be, then Lasserre 
considers that the re form wi 11 fall into indifference and a great 
many complications will have been introduced for nothinq. But 
if the workers share takes on a more important aspect then the 
(95) Article 2 See pages 22 to 24 supra 
(96) Lasserre La Participation p. 80. 
(97) ibid p.81 
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85 % of those who are excluded, through no fault of their own, 
will want their share. 
"It is there that the danger of the unlucky Ordinance 
lies, and not in the prophesies of doom voiced by 
management and the stock exchange." (9 8) 
Nevertheless the official French Government's view is that 
t h e measure does appear to be operating successfully. The Secretary 
o f State for the Ministry of Labour Employment and Population 
M. Phillippe de Chartre in a report on the operation of the 
Ordinance up to the beginning of 1971 stated: 
"In all objectivity, and at the present moment, one can 
conclude, I think, in the success of the application of 
the Ordinance of 1967, taking into account the different 
objectives which it includes. This success is owed, of 
course, to the decisive action of those who have been 
the promoters and the pioneers of this reform and also to 
the progressive understanding and to the profound intuition 
of the work force. From the present time ... it is 
incontestable that, by the ap p lication of the participation 
agreements, the partners in the company have found, within 
their enterprises, the possibility for concrete and 
objective discussions, taking place in a climate of free 
co-operation. I add ... that the Ordinance of 1967 has 
well-defined objectives, and that it is fundamental, in 
particular, that it does not have an influence on salaries, 
it introduces a participation by employees in the fruits 
of company ecpansion ... We have a feeling that beyond the 
initial reservations, a large agreement is developing 
and that beyond even today's results, one will perceive, 
as the President of the Republic noted, in his last press 
conference, the capital importance of the Ordinance of 196 7 
in three or four years." (99) 
(98) ibid p. 83. The reader should note that although Lasserre is 
particularly severe in his criticism of the provisions, 
application and aims of the Ordinance he does offer a con-
structive alternative, namely workers' co-operatives. In 
these co-operatives the workers own the means of production or 
the goods which are produced and are totally responsible for 
the success of the operation; Fonctions du profit et 
participation des travailleurs, Economies et Societes, Vol. V. 
No. 12, December 1971. See also b y the same author La reforrre 
de l'entreprise et la participation. 
(99) BiJ an et perspectives de l'Ordonnance de 1967 sur la 
participation des Salaries aux Fruits de l'expansion des 
entreprises. Notes du Ministere du Travail, 25-31 January, 1971 . 
-44-
No doubt, as in most controversies the truth of the 
situation lies somewhere between the two extremes and the 
Ordinance is proving moderately successful but may well require 
certain important modifications if it is to fully achieve its 
purpose. At any event it is probably too early to pass judgment 
on the scheme which will not give the great majority of employees 
any tangible cash benefit until it has been in operation for 
5 to 8 years. 
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PARI' IV THE ADVANTAGES OF PPOFIT-SHARING LEGISLATION 
We have now considered profit-sharing legislation in New 
Zealand and France. From the experience of nearly half a century 
it is clear that s.67 of the New Zealand Companies Act 1955 is 
moribund . On the other hand the French profit-sharing 
legislation corrrrnencing with the Ordinance of 17 August 1967 has 
not yet been in operation long enougri for a reasonably conclusive 
judgment to be made on its success. For this reason the following 
pages will consider the views of some of the comrrentators on 
profit-sharing in an endeavour to assess wriat benefits can 
reasonably be expected from the enactrnent of legislation 
designed to require or encourage profit-sharing. 
THE INCENTIVE ASPECT OF PROFIT-SHARING 
Does a profit-sharing scheme in fact act as an incentive to 
individual employees to make a greater effort and thereby 
increase production? 
"The value of profit-sharing and co-partnership cannot be 
assessed solely by reference to the amount of the financial 
benefit accruing to the participants, and, moreover for 
some kinds of schernes this financial benefit cannot be 
identified for precise rre as urement." ( 100) 
In 1946, a report from the National Industrial Conference 
Board of the U.S.A. doubted whether the amounts distributed to 
individual employees were usually large enough to induce 
(100) Profit-Sharing and Co-Partnership Schewes,~inistry of Labour 
Gazette (U.K.) May 1956 p.166. Referred to as Labour 
Gazette, May 1956. 
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employees to put more effort into their work (100A) .At that tiITe 
in the U.S.A. the maximum tax deduction allowed to companies 
for profit-sharing bonuses was 15 per cent of the wages bill. 
A survey of 264 schemes showed that slightly less than half the 
schemes distributed amounts in excess of ten per cent of annual 
wages ( 101) . In the United Kingdom a survey in 1955 by the 
Ministry of Labour reported that, of 259 active profit-sharing 
plans, 16 3 paid amounts to employees of less than ten per cent 
of wages and the average paid to all participants in profit-
sharing schemes was 6.3 per cent of wages (102). In Australia, 
amounts varying from O. 6 per cent to 16 per cent of the annual wages 
bill of their respective firms were distributed to employees in 
1951 (103). 
Dr. Lau has calculated the possible effect of profit-sharing 
in New Zealand in terms of increased benefit for employees. 
(100A) Brower, Beatrice F. Experience with Profit Sharing, The 
Conference Board Management Record, New York National 
Industrial Conference Board, Vol. VIII, No. 2, February 
1946 pp.33-38. 
(lOJ.) Flippo, Edwin B. Profit Sharing in American Business, 
Bureau of Business Research, College of Commerce and 
Administration, Ohio State University 1954 p. 41. 
(102) Labour Gazette, May 1956. 
(103) Hurley, W.M. and Wickham, O.P. A review of Australian 
Profit Sharing Practice. Personnel Practice Bulletin 
Vol. VII, No. 3 September 1951 pp.3-10. See also 
Westaway & Jacob. Profit-sharing Experience in Australia 
and Overseas (1959) Vol. XV ~o. 1 Personnel Practice 
Bulletin. pp.22-33. 
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According to Reserve Bank statistics for 1971 th.e average 
company incorre in New Zealand was approximately 9 per cent tax 
paid. If 8 per cent were set aside for dividends and reserves 
and if the balance were shared 50: 50 between the labour force 
and shareholders the average profit shared bonus would be about 
seventy million or about 3.2 per cent i.e. still less than two 
weeks wages if all employees participate and that is a relatively 
good year ( 10 4) • Dr. Lau concludes: 
"The monetary reward resulting from profit-sharing alone 
will not be large eno~gh to influence the employee's 
attitude. Therefore a profit-sharing scherre should never 
be introduced as a substitute for good wages and good 
working conditions." (105) 
Even if profit-sharing did si gni fi cant ly increase a New Zea land 
worker's earnings would this guarantee better industrial relations? 
Howells and Woodfield (106) in their survey of worker union and 
rnanagerrent preferences in two firms in the freezinq industry 
concluded inter alia: 
"Union officers followed management in exaggerating 
the motivation value of money, but seemed to deny that 
it applied to themselves - their predictions for this one 
item were considerably in excess of their own preferences. 
This settled conviction by management and officers that 
workers are 'wage-pursuing automata' motivated mainly by 
the dollar has been revealed by other writers. Though the 
pay packet theory, as C'.A. Mace describes it, is not a bad place 
(10 4) 
( 10 5) 
(106) 
N.Z. Cormnerce September 1971 p.11-12 
ibid. p.12. 
Associate Professor and Lecturer respectively in the 
Department of Economics at the University of 
Otago. 
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to start from, the real danger is that it stifles thought 
at precisely the point where thought should begin." (107) 
The theory has recently been advanced that most unrest and 
conflict between workers and management in industry is not 
because of financial rewards, even if these are the apparent 
or superficial cause of conflict. In an attempt to answer the 
question what motivates men, not s imply to go to work, but more im-
portantly to work to the best of the ability recent studies in the 
behavourial sciences: 
11 
••• have challenged the view that workers are by nature 
lazy and work shy and have argued that what motivates 
men to achievement is the chance to exercise the skills 
and capacities which are denied in many jobs. Job 
enlargement and job enrichment are aJ11_ong the indicated 
remedies . 11 (10 8) 
11 money is seldom a source of positive satisfaction, 
that what motives achievement as the chance to realise 
some aspect of the self, some skill or capacity." (109) 
The writer suggests that the conclusion to be drawn frow the 
above discussion is that any additional financial advantage to the 
worker by virtue of a profit-sharing scheme should not be relied 
on in itself to achieve harmonious inoustrial relations. 
IMPACT ON INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 
What contribution is profit-sharing likely to make towards 
improving industrial relations? 
A particularly thorough study of the effect of profit sharing 
plans on labour and management relations was undertaken by 
(107) The Ability of Managers and Trade Union Officers to Predict 
Workers' Preferen::es (1970) 8 B.J.I.L. 249-50. 
(108) Cotgrove, Dunham and Vamplew The Nylon Spinners ,P· 8 
(109) ibid p.28 
-49-
Helburn in 1965 (110). His findings were based on the responses 
to questionnaires by management and/or unions in a representative 
sample of American Companies. The following table indicates the 
impact of profit-sharing upon industrial relations as seen by 
managerrent and unions in Helburn' s study. 
MANAGEMENT AND UNION: THE IMPACT OF P PO FIT SHARING UPON 
Industrial 
Relations 
Improved 
Worsened 
No effect 
Can't 
evaluate 
Total 
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS (111) 
Management 
Number Per Cent Number 
115 55.6 34 
2 1.0 7 
35 16. 9 34 
55 26.6 28 
20:? 100 .1 10 3 
Union 
Per Cent 
33.0 
6.8 
33.0 
2 7. 2 
100. 0 
The large number of "no effect" or "can't evaluate" answers 
emphasises the fact that profit-sharing is but one of a number 
of factors influencing a labour-managerrent relationship. Therefore 
it is not easy to isolate and evaluate with any precision the 
influence of profit-sharing in any given situation. 
In a further questionnaire respondents were asked to rate in 
order of importance undesirable occurrences which profit-sharing 
might have helped to reduce. Six occurrences were listed: 
(110) This study and its results are published in Metzger , 
Profit Sharing in Perspective op.163-177. 
(111) ibid. p.168 Table 28A. 
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MANAGE.MENT AND UNION: THE EFFECT OF PROFIT SHARING ON THE 
REDUCTION OF SPECIFIC FACTORS IN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS (112) 
Overall Score (113) 
Number of Times mentioned 
as a per cent of response 
113) 
Factors Management Union Management Union 
Turnover 562 219 69.0% 49. 4 % 
Reject and salvage 231 131 36. 9 % 32. 3% 
Work stoppages 145 89 22.0% 25. 3% 
Absenteeism 119 88 2 3. 8% 25.3% 
Written grievances 89 50 18.5% 20.7% 
Tardiness 69 40 17.3% 12. 6 % 
Desoite the rather encouraging results of Helburn's survey the 
writer considers that one should not place too much reliance on an 
improvement in industrial relations solely as a result of the 
introduction of a profit-sharing scheme. The reasonable 
expectations of profit-sharing are 'vell exoressed by Westaway & 
Jacobs as follows: 
"There is general agreement among- writers that no plan 
can be successful where relations between union and management 
are poor or where the general atmosphere is filled with mutual 
distrust. Profit-sharing they claim should emerge as a 
tangible expression of existing healthy industrial relations; 
it has little chance of altering existing poor industrial 
relationships." (114) 
(112) 
(113) 
(114) 
i bi d p • 16 8 Tab le 30 A 
The overall score was derived by assigning a value of six 
points for first ranking, a value of five points for secona 
ranking, etc. through six ranks, and adding total points 
assigned. Some respondents simply checked factors rather 
than ranking them. If only one factor was checked, it was 
given six points . If more than one factor was checked, 
there were no points assigned to any of the factors, but 
the checks were counted in the "number of times rrentioned". 
Personnel Practice Bulletin(1959)Vol XV No. 1 p.32 
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E~YLOYEE SHAREHOLDING AS A TYPE OF PROFIT-SHARING 
Two important reasons are often given by the advocates of 
extended share ownership. Firstly the economic well being of a 
country requires that as average earnings rise, an increasing 
number of people should retain so:rre money for investment after 
immediate needs have been met. Although these surpluses may 
individually be small, in total they can amount to a considerable 
sum which wisely invested, could contribute substantially to the 
rate of the national growth. Secondly the fact that the ownership 
of industry is often concentrated in relatively few hands can give 
rise to a socially undesirable situation and can lead to 
unnecessary divisions and hostilities (115). 
A report completed in 196 3 by Guy Naylor, Barrister-at-law, 
commissioned by the British Wider Share Ownership Council 
investigated whether there was any enthusiasrr in British industry 
for providing facilities for employee ownership of shares, either 
in the employing company or outside it. 
Companies which had not adopted suc1. scheITles often did so for 
several main reasons. Some felt that if a company provides 
opportunities to buy its own shares it may appear to be inaucing 
or encouraging its employees to do so, but that if it provides 
opnort uni ties to buy other shares it may appear to be recommending 
(115) "The 1965-6 Survey of Share Ownership by the London Stock 
Exchange gave an estimated 2 1/2 million share owners, or 
about 7% of the U.K. adult r:opulation. The 1965 census of 
shareowners conducted by the New York Stock Exchange shows 
that there are 20 million share owners in the U.S. adult 
population of 119 million or nearly 17%." 
Sharing the Profits Act_on Society Trust and Guy Naylor 
ed!Garnstone Press Limited,1968,p. XVII 
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them. In either case, if anything goes wrong, the employee may 
expect to be rescued by his employer. Moreover an employee with 
shares in the company in which he works has too many eggs in one 
basket. This however could be circumvented by encouraging employees 
to become shareholders in unit trusts rather than the employer 
company. Another argument was that the average employee should 
not invest in equities at all until he has got some readily 
realisable savings (e.g. in the Post Office or a Building Society), 
has taken care of life assurance, is within reasonable distance of 
completing any mortgage payments to which he is committed, and can 
cope with hire hire-purchase obligations. It is difficult to 
a scheme which is fair, certain and explicable to employees. The 
average employee is uninterested in shareholding and would always 
pre fer money. It is doubtful "whether possession of a stock 
certificate turns an employee into a capitalist". (116). 
The most prevalent motives for starting schemes were to give 
an employee a sense of identification with the company. A minority 
view was that it would stimulate an interest in how the capitalist 
system works, and consequently lessen the appeal of 
of industry. Other motives were to create an interest in the 
business in general, to stimulate loyalty to encourage, attract 
and keep good employees, to provide incentive and a stake in the 
business, to encourage saving and provide for retirement. 
Naylor includes in his report a "glancing reference" to what 
he was able to gather about the viewpoint of the employees from 
(116) ibid pp.105-6. 
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talking to employers. He did not find the view th.at employee 
shareholding encourages incentive and loyalty was widely held by 
employers. On the contrary some companies felt that better results 
were obtained from providing other benefits of a benevolent nature. 
It was also felt that profit-sharing (whether it takes the form of 
shares or not) which is based on the profits of the year is 
intrinsically unfair to the employee because within certain limits 
what he does or does not do has little effect on the year's profits 
or dividends ( 117) . 
A further important question discussed by Naylor is that "Even 
if loyalty, incentive, identification, integration ;_ nto the 
capitalist society, instinct for saving and many other lauda' i le 
methods can be ad1ieved by employee shareholding" is this the 
best method and if so, can the average employee afford it?(117A) An 
average employee may already have many financial obligations both 
connected with and a1?art from his place of work. The former 
obligation would include mortgage, life assurance and hire-purchase 
payments while the examples of the latter are pension schemes, 
life assurance, company savings banks, facilities for investment 
in national savings, unit trusts, investment clubs, trade union 
dues and miscellaneous payments such things as Christmas, social 
or sporting clubs, charities or presents. This large number of 
potential demands on a worker's pay packet can at least raise a 
prima facie doubt as to whether the average employee is well advised 
to become a shareholder at all. 
(117) ibid p.109. 
(117A) ibid p.110. 
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In Italy legislation has provided for the distribution of 
company shares either free or at specially favourable prices for 
employees of a company, but the general experience has been 
dis appointing be cause the shares were sold inure di ately the 
employees were entiteld to do so (118). West Germany allows a 
maximum amount of 624DM (about $NZ161.00) a year to be attributed 
to employees in the form of shares in their employer companies. These 
shares are given at preferential rates but must not be sold for a 
period of five years. In Belgium also the re is legislation giving 
employees certain tax benefits on the attribution to them of 
shares in their employer companies (119). 
On the New Zealand scene Dr. Lau's suggestion for a successful 
profit-sharing scheme is that co-partnership or the holding of 
shares in the employer company by allocating the profit share in the 
form of shares in the company is generally speaking not desirable. 
"In times of adversity when employees need their savings 
most the value of shares fall. Also in listed companies 
there is the undesirable incentive to sell when share 
prices rise. Finally when employees are shareholders 
there may be a confli et between them and outside share-
holders as to the amount which should be distributed and 
the amount whi eh should be retained for reserves and such 
conflict coul:3 have the opposite result from that for 
which the scheme is designed to attain." (120) 
(118) 
(119) 
( 12 0) 
L'Actionnariat des Salaries p.26. ________________, 
Law of the 27 June 1970, Article (3): see L'Actionnariat 
des Salaries p.26 
Aspects of Profit Sharing, N.Z. Commerce, Vol.27, No. 3, 
September 1971, at p.12. Referred to in this paper as 
N.Z. Commerce, September 1971. 
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INCREASED EFFICIENCY AND PRODUCTION 
Is the ass urnption that profit-sharing wi 11 lead to increased 
efficiency and production justified? In the Profit-Sharing Research 
Foundation Supplementary survey of March-April 1963 (121) manage-
ments were asked to rate their profit-sharing programmes' effective-
ness relative to specific benefits. The following ratings were given: 
Per cent of companies 
rating profit sharing 
program "moderately 
effective " or "very 
effective" relative to 
specific benefit 
Specific Benefit 
e. In furthering employee interest 
in company, loyalty, feeling of 
partnership, sense of belonging 
a. In improving morale, teamwork, 
and co-operation 
i. As a means of recognising and 
rewarding individuals for their 
contributions to growth of com-
pany 
Cash 
plans 
9 3% 
93% 
82% 
f. In improving quality, pride in 
workmanship, sense of responsibility 82% 
d. In increasing productive efficiency 81% 
c. In attracting and holding desirable 
employees (reducing turnover) 79% 
j. In giving employees a better 
understanding of factors entering 
into business success (economic 
education) 74% 
h. In facilitating the introduction 
of new methods and equipment 64% 
b. In reducing wasted time and 
materials(cutting costs) 62% 
g. In providing economic security 
for employees 60% 
(121) Metzger., Profit-Sharing In Perspective p. 12 9 . 
Deferred 
Plans 
94% 
84% 
72% 
65% 
50% 
84% 
52% 
24% 
55% 
93% 
~56-,.. 
The majority of cash plans were considered effective in 
helping the companies realise all ten enumerated benefits. 
The same survey obtained management comments on deficiencies 
in profit-sharing schemes. It was found that profit-sharing cannot 
be very successful unless in most normal years there are profits 
to share. Profit-sharing far from being a substitute for competent 
management, had in fact challenged management to greater competence 
because profit-sharing employees expected and responded t o dynamic 
leadership. Communication of the philosophy and benefits of 
profit-sharing must be continuously and persuasively presented to 
employees. Very few plans were conside·red "very effective" in 
achieving the goal of "reducing wasted time and materials". 
"This highlights the facts that employees will not automatically 
cut costs and save on materials just because they will share 
in the profits. They must be told how much things cost, how 
savings can be achieved; and be shown how these costs 
reductions and/or savings affect their profit shares before 
they will be able to contribute effectively in this area." (122) 
Recent English studies have cast some doubt on the value of 
financial incentives to stimulate and maintain increased efficiency 
over a period of time. Strictly speaking these investigations 
relate to payment by results schemes rather than profit-sharing as 
defined in this paper. Nevertheless it is considered that their 
findings offer some assistance in assessing the relation between 
profit-sharing and increased efficiency. 
Behrend (123) comments that the usefulness of payment by results 
schemes is being doubted by many industrialists who have becone 
(122) 
( 12 3) 
ibidp.122. 
of the University of Edinburgh. 
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aware that the effectiveness of their incentive schemes is wearing 
off while in some cases changes in industrial technology have 
led to the abandonment of incentive schemes by some firms (124). 
Behrend suggests that it is almost impossible to find direct 
and objective statistical evidence to support the widely held 
belief that there is a direct relationship between the application 
of incentive schemes and the raising of standards of effort. 
Therefore one is obliged to fall back on the evaluation of behaviour 
and opinions by workers and managers as to whether the schemes they 
use work satisfactorily. However this evidence may not be conclusive 
because even where a scheme is working badly management who have 
faith in it will excuse its scant earnings by attributing lack of 
success to the improper use of the scheme. 
"The danger of this type of assertion is that it can 
become dogmatic and t '3.Utological so that people simply 
assert that it works when it works. Qualifications about 
proper use and application may become defences against 
attack and doubt; for if you qualify away all possible 
sources of trouble then obviously all is well." (125) 
Looking more specifically at the question raised by Behrend 
as to the inappropriateness of incentive schemes in view of changes 
in industrial technology the view has been expressed that such 
schemes will decline where the work pace is set by the machine and 
the output limited by the capacity of the equipment. Bean ( 126) and 
( 12 4) 
( 12 5) 
(126) 
Hilde Behrend An Assessment of the Current Status of 
Incentive Schemes (1963-4) Vol. 5-6 Journal of Industrial 
Relations p.96. 
ibid p.99 • 
Lecturer in Economics University of Liverpool. 
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Garside (127) in a study of the relevance of Payrrent by Results 
Systems to Capital Intensive Operations have found that the 
experience in a number of European countries and the U .S .A. is that: 
"the net effect of recent technological changes seems to 
have been expansion rather than abandonrrent of incentive 
coverage. With increasing capital per worker the 
spreading of overhead costs via capacity utilisation of 
equipment becomes an important consideration. This leads 
Bolle de Bal to distinguish a "sti.mulation" function of 
payment by output, encouraging workers to increase 
production, and a 'regulation' function aimed at 'the 
maintenance of a certain minimum level of production 
necessary to ensure the profitability of ever more costly 
technical investments', i.e. to prevent operatives 
from neglecting production and allowing output to fall 
below a certain threshold level. He postulates, as an 
adaption of payment rrethods to new technical conditions, 
a future decline in the stimulation function in favour 
of the regulatory." (12 8) 
Bean and Garside concluded that in the medium term Payirent by 
Results schemes of a regulative type aimed at the maintenance of 
certain minimum level of production necessary to ensure the 
profitability of ever more costly technical investments could well 
become central to the whole concept of incentives (129). 
QUALIFYIT\JG PERIOD 
As far back as 1922 the U.K. Ministry of Labour reported that 
although a profit-sharing scheme may exclude persons who are not 
(127) 
(12 8) 
(129) 
Assistant Industrial Relations Officer, British Steel 
Corporation, Scunthorpe. 
Payment by Results Systems: Some Indicators of Incidence 
and Relevance to Capital Intensive Operations B.J.I.R. July 
1971 p.182. Bolle de Bal The Psycho-Sociology of ~age 
Incentives B.J.I.L., Vol III No. 3,Novernber 1969 p.390 
B.J.I.L. July 1971 p.197 
-59"<" 
adults or who have not been in the service of the employer for some 
reasonable qualifying period, it should include not less than 75% of 
the total number of adult employees who have been in the service of 
the business for at le as t one year ( 130) . 
Seear and Copeman in their introduction to an inquiry into the 
"Habits, attitudes and problems of employees' shareholding schemes" 
consider it may be reasonable to exclude short-term employees from 
a scheme, since it is an administrative nuisance and uneconomic to 
have to take into a scheme those who are not staying long and have 
little real interest in the company. Moreover, the scherre should be 
mainly concerned with providing some extra reward for those who 
invest their working lives with a company. 
B.L. ~etzger comments that the decision on eligibility 
requirements will depend on the composition of the work force (131), 
and als o on the company's objectives of the profit sharing plan. 
Exclusion of transient workers from a deferred plan through a waiting 
period simplifies plan administration and accounting anc1 maximises the 
benefit for the smaller number who are eligible. 
"On the other hand, management may establish the profit-
sharing program (whether cash, deferred, or combination) 
to ere ate group cohesiveness and a company-wi d e incentive 
to co-operation and productive efficiency. If such is 
the case, man age men t may very we 11 fee 1 that all ( or almost 
all) employees should be brought under the program quickly 
so that the broadest effects can be realised from profit-
sharing." (132) 
(130) 19 20 Cmd. s. 44 p. 4 "Sharing the Profits" The Acton Society 
Trust and Guy Naylor,Garnstone Press. 1969. p.XXI. 
(131) e.g. seasonal, part-time or full-time permanent workers. 
(132) Metzger Profit Sharing in Perspective p.55 
--o-
D::-. La c nsic.ers tl at it is ::::> tt r t 
11 numl.:l · 
sta:::: ·,.,~ .. 0 artici ate and to ay t inai \·iduall_· cl 1i 1 
,. ,- h ~) l'L" 
the nro::i ts than to distribute t e er nta t l all le am 
all t,11e err:p loyees and thereb~· arri \·e at a 1 Ke. 
1'\ n f it f r l 
::.he::o. A ::urther reason for inposinq a quali f _•i 1 _ D ri d is 
"generall · speaking, t !1e staff whid1 has be n with a 
::or a number of years \·,hich I11al.ces t11e most c ntributi 
its profit ability. I would say the re fore that a s h n 
could well provide that before a rrember of the ta f f 
th,1 
qualifies for t,11e profit sharing sd1e he nust 1a,r. b n 
in the employment of the comoan v for not 1 s than two 
years. This would increase substantially the orofit 
sharing bonus of those who participate ana it should a1 o 
be an incentive for the newer staff to reIT'ain with th 
cornoany and not for negliqible reasons chanoe em loyn nt, 
as happens so often." (133) 
EMPLOYEE INFORMATION 
11 
n 
] 
1n 
The Profit c;haring Research Foundation considers that ffe ti v
 
coIT'munication to employees is the "life blood" of any profit-sh
aring 
scherre (134). A common fault is that firms fail to maximise
 the 
incentive potential of a profit-sharing orogramme through lack 
of 
sufficient employee communication. 
( 133) 
(134) 
(135) 
"Successful profit-sharing is directly linked to kindling 
the profit motive in your employees, to making them feel 
they are partners with managerrent in ere ating profits ... 
Employees nust constantly be reminded that out of profits 
and only out of profits do they get good jobs, good pay, 
good benefits, good working conditions, good service, 
good equipment. And a profit-sharing plan brings all 
these factors into .murediate focus for them - if the company 
is profitable and the plan is properly communicated to them" (13
!3) 
N.Z. Commerce, Sept. 1971 p.12 
Metzger. Profit Sharing in Perspective p.184 
Stanley D. Noble - President of the Council of Profit-Sharing 
Industries. Address :before the Mid-Continent Trust Conference 
held in Minneapolis, October 31 to November 1, 196 3 Metzger 
Profit Sharing in Perspective p.192 
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The type of communication recommended by the Profit-Sharing 
Research Foundation includes: 
( a) Thoroughly in forming management about the purposes of the 
orofi t-sharing plan. 
(b) Informing the employees when the plan is installed. 
(c) Selecting the appropriate media to accomplish (b) whether 
by meetings, letters, booklets, staterrents of account, posters, 
charts, slides or fi lrns. 
(d) Important communications on the programme should come from 
the top of the organisation. 
(e) Communication should be made when employee interest in ~rofit-
sharing is highest. 
(f) Profit-sharing should be used as an incentive to develop 
interest, loyalty, enthusiasm, cost-consciousness, profit-
mirrledness and a spirit of co-operation among employees. 
The justification for this effort is the: 
"impressive relationships between successful profit-sharing 
communication programs and successful plans, between 
unsuccessful plans and inadequate profit-sharing communication 
programs." ( 136) . 
Dr. Lau in commenting on the success of profit-s~aring in 
certain companies states that an important factor was the communication 
by management to the staff of as much of the company's business policy 
as results as could be done without adversely affecting the business. 
(136) Metzger Profit-Sharing in Perspective p.191 
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"Keeping the staff informed of future planning, of 
orders on hand, of results of trade conditions, etc., 
has in the view of many managers been the main reason 
for the success of the profit-sharing scheme and the 
long term success of their company. Some went so far 
to say that good communication was a more important 
feature than the profit-sharing scheme." (137) 
The writer therefore concludes that the emphasis placed 
on worker management communication and dialogue in the 1967 French 
profit-sharing legislation is well justified (138). Therefore 
any country intending to introduce profit-sharing legislation 
should give close and careful consideration to providing for a 
reliable system of employer-employee communication. 
TAXATION ASPECTS OF PROFIT-SHARING 
The cost of a profit-sharing scheme to a firm depends to a 
large extent on whether the share allocated for the employees is 
taxable especially if the firm's profits are taxed at a high rate. 
At the same time the provisions concerning personal income tax 
affect the amount which an employee actually receives and thereby 
influences the effectiveness of the scheme. As discussed earlier 
in this paper the taxation legislation affecting profit-sharing in 
New Zealand is a positive disincentive for the adoption by firms of 
profit-sharing schemes ( 139) . 
In the United Kingdom payments made by a company under a profit-
sharing scheme are generally allowed in the company's assessments to 
incorre tax and profits tax, being allowed as an expense of carrying 
on the business and treated in the company's accounts as an addition 
(137) 
( 138) 
( 139) 
N.Z. Commerce, September 1971 p.11 
See pp. 39 to 40 supra 
See pp. 14 to 16 supra 
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to wages or salaries; However the employee's benefits are treated as 
earned income and taxed under P.A.Y.E. If distribution is made other-
wise than in cash, the individual employees will probably find their 
income tax liability increased without their cash resources being 
increased to meet it, with the result that until the benefits are 
converted into enough cash to compensate for this increased liability, 
their immediate net cash income position will be worse than if there 
had been no profit-sharing scheme at all. (139A) 
The taxation position in Britain and New Zealand compares 
unfavourably with that in some other counfries. In the United States 
the employer's contributions to a deferred profit-sharing programme 
are deductible as a business expense up to 15% of the annual com-
pensation of participants. The employee participant is not currently 
taxed on his share of the company's contribution. The fund earnings 
such as dividends and interest are not currently taxed and therefore 
compound much more rapidly. Tax on a participating employee's 
profit-sharing trust account is deferred until the employee actually 
or constructively receives benefits (usually at retirement, death, 
disability or severence of employment). Employer securities, 
distributed to a terminating fund member as part of an immediate 
settlement are computed fur tax purposes at average acquisition cost 
rather than at market value. Any appreciation on such security above 
the acquisition cost is excluded from tax and is taxed only when 
the stock is sold. If such stock is held until the death of a 
(139A) Harper, Profit Sharing in Practice and Law, p.28, 29 
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rnember the appreciqt~on is never taxed (140) 
In West Germany tax exemptions are given to sum of up to 
624 DM (141) (about $NZ161.00) per worker per annum alloted by 
a 
company for an cpproved scheme of employee saving and investment
. In 
the case of profit-sharing or bonuses such a scheme requires th
at 
the sums be retained by the employer at interest for a period o
f not 
less than five years. 
It is obvious that a country's taxation laws will have a vital 
effect on whether a company will decide to implerrent a profit-sh
aring 
scheme as opposed to an alternative form of employee benefit. T
he 
writer therefore considers that the total absence of any tax 
incentives for profit-sharing in New Zealand must be critically
 
examined in the light of overseas experience. 
(140) Metzger Profit Sharing in Perspective p.200-201; see U.S.
 
Internal Revenue Code of 1954 for the Rules for qualifying 
a deferred profit-sharing trust. 
(141) Laws of 12 July 1961, 1 July 1965, 27 June 1970 
See L'Actionnariat des Salaries p.27 
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PART 5: CONCLUSION: PROFIT SHARING REFORM IN NEW ZEALAND 
There are two principal reasons for which a Government 
might wish to enact legislation to require or encourage 
profit-sharing. Firstly it may hold the view that profit 
sharing is an expression of social justice and is therefore a 
desirable end in itself. This social justice consideration 
appears to have been a crucial element in the French 
legislation on profit-sharing (142). The second reason is that 
profit-sharing can be justified in hard economic terms by 
the benefits which companies with such schemes have obtained. 
The merits of this argument were examined in the last section 
of this paper ( 143) where certain of the studies referred to 
suggested that profit-sharing may, where properly administered, 
act as an incentive to increased production and efficiency and 
can even result in improved industrial relations. It was 
apparent, however, that because profit-sharing is but one of 
a number of factors influencing any given labour-management 
relationship it is difficult to specify with any degree of 
certainty just how great a role profit-sharing plays in the 
overall situation. For this reason the writer does not intend 
to express an opinion on the desirability of profit-sharing 
re form in New Zealand. Such a decision is not really a legal 
matter but rather of an economic, political or social nature. 
(142) 
(14 3) 
See p. l supra 
See pp.45-64 supra 
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"What, however, is an appropriate subject for consideration in 
this paper are the ways in which experience already gained in the 
field of profit-sharing could be usefully applied in this country. 
On the assumption therefore that profit-sharing reform was 
considered desirable in New Zealand the question arises as to the 
best method of implementing such a reform. Using the French 
Ordinance of 17 August 1967 as a point of reference the writer 
sets forth his views on this subject. 
a. Should profit-sharing be compulsory? 
The first question is whether worker participation in 
company profits should be made compulsory for all firms employing 
more than a certain number of staff. As we saw earlier the 
initial French profit-sharing legislation of 1959 which was 
optional in character and aimed to encourage firms to implement 
profit-sharing schemes by means of tax and social security 
exemptions was not a success (144). Despite this failure the 
writer suggests it would be quite inappropriate to contemplate 
compulsory profit-sharing in New Zealand at this stage. Rather 
taxation incentives should be rendered sufficiently attractive 
to ensure that firms and their employees would be very reluctant 
not to take advantage of such measures. It is considered unwise 
to impose a profit-sharing scheme on a firm whose profit may be 
so low as to render the return to the worker insignificant. Such 
an arrangement would probably fail completely as an incentive to 
( 144) See p.18 supra 
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workers and may do more harm than good to the concept of profit-
sharing (145). Alternatively in such a situation an incentive 
based on output may be a fairer way of rewarding individual 
effort because the failure to make a profit may be a factor quite 
beyond the worker's control (146). By leaving profit-sharing 
a matter of choice depending on its appropriateness for any given 
firm the invidious distinctions which are referred to by Lasserre 
as arising under the French Legislation ( 14 7) could be either 
avoided or at least not attributed to the legislation. 
b. Investment and period of unavailability of workers funds 
The five year period during whi eh the French worker is 
umable to dispose of the share of the profits distributed to him 
is of course vital to the policy of encouraging savings aimed 
at by the Ordinance of 17 August 1967. Since profit-sharing 
should not be used as a substitute for an adequate wage there 
may be some considerable merit in tying up this additional source 
of worker's ready cash. New Zealand which must rely heavily on 
overseas capital could by this method attain a greater degree 
of self-financing in the development of its economy. The worker 
( 145) "Fluctuating profits means that the lottery element in profit 
sharing is more pronounced. It has sometirres been claimed 
that profit-sharing can be introduced in firms whi eh are 
not making profits, as the incentive provided by the 
scheme will provide profits in the future. Such 
cases seem to be rare in practice ... " Profit Sharing 
Department of Labour and National Service (Australia) 
1949, here referred to as "Profit-sharing" . 
(146) "Profits are affected by many factors other than the efforts 
put forth by the employees, such as business fluctuation, 
overseas trade, the efficiency of management, the 
efficiency of competitors, etc. There is no certainty that 
increased effort will result in increased financial reward 
through a profit-sharing plan" Profit Sharing p.19. 
(147) See pp. 41-42 supra. 
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also stands to gain in some important respects by a period of 
unavailability of his share in the profits. During this period 
his compulsory savings will be profitably invested and compounding 
interest. Moreover this total amount will be free of tax. For 
these reasons the temporary unavailability of these funds should 
be more than compensated for by the increased amount which the 
worker ultimately receives. (148) 
The ways in which the workers profit-sharing fund should 
be invested during its period of unavailability has been well 
explored in the French legislation (149) and should be suitable 
for adoption in New Zealand allowing for local modifications. 
However, it was seen that since so few participation agreements 
chose employee shareholding as a rrethod of investment additional 
legislation was required in 1970 and 1971. New Zealand could 
therefore gain the benefit of this experience by enacting from 
the outset, especially favourable conditions for this type of 
investment. The writer considers that employee shareholding 
should be encouraged because it is probably the purest application 
of the spirit of profit-sharing since it identifies the interests 
and prosperity of the workers with those of their company (150) 
(148) Dr. Lau shares this view. Discussing the West German 
legislation granting tax exemption for approved profit-
sharing schemes he says: "While normally employees would 
be reluctant to wait six years for their profit share, if 
they know they will receive it tax free with interest 
I suggest it would be most acceptable to them and of 
course they would receive the statement each year showing 
how their profit-sharing bonus is accumulating" N. Z. 
Commerce September 1971 p.12 
(149) See pp. 33-37 supra 
(150) The problems which this identification of interests may 
give rise to have already been discussed at pp.51-54 of 
this paper. 
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c. Length of qualifying service 
A most important consideration in a profit-sharing scheme 
is the length of service an employee should have with a firm 
before becoming entitled to share in its profits. The French 
Ordinance lays down a period of at least three months to 
qualify. As mentioned earlier in this paper one third of all 
agreements which came before the C.E.R.C. seeking to derogate 
from the Ordinance did so only insofar as they sought approval 
for a longer period of qualifying service than three months (151). 
The report of the French Ministry of Labour of 25-31 January, 1971 
suggested that the three month period might require modification 
in view of the widespread wish to alter it in the agreements 
concluded between the parties. 
This whole question raises an important point as to the 
underlying purpose of the French Scheme. In Case H-0118-Company 
D , 27 January 1970 the C.E.R.C. held that the Ordinance 
did not have for its object the encouragement of the stability 
of personnel but rather the allocation of a share in the fruits 
of expansion to all employees who by their work had contributed 
to such expansion irrespective of their length of service (152). 
This approach is sharply in contrast to the American view which 
looks to profit-sharing to assist in such factors as reducing 
labour turnover and retaining good personnel (153). 
(151) See pp.28-30 supra 
(152) See Case H.0118-Company D 27 January 1970 . 
(153) See pp.SO and 55 supra. As to the question of 
qualifying period generally, see pp.58-60 supra. 
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In the writer's opinion the French three month qualifying 
period has little to recormnend it apart from giving an almost 
immediate company-wide incentive. It fails to capitalise on 
the benefit whi eh a longer qualifying period may give in reducing 
labour turnover. By making short-term workers eligible the 
cake to be shared among the entire staff must be divided into 
smaller pieces and therefore its value as an incentive is diminished 
Lastly it is not unreasonable to give sorre greater reward to 
those who invest their working lives or a significant part thereof 
with the company in preference to those who are just passing 
through. 
It is therefore recommended that for a profit-sharing 
agreement to be eligible for favourable taxation provisions a 
minimum qualifying period of one or two years service should be 
required. 
d. The definition of the beneficiaries 
The French rule of non-discrimination (154) in defining 
the bene fi ci aries of a profit-sharing scheme is , it is submitted, 
a sound approach and one whi eh could be adopted without 
significant alteration in the requirements for a profit-sharing 
agreement in this country. 
e. The profit-sharing formula 
The writer considers that the parties should be free to 
adopt their own formula for the profit-sharing benefit to be 
received by participants. This formula should be simple and not 
(154) See pp.30-32 of this paper. 
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subject to the criticism of the French formula which Lasserre 
considers is more likely to bewilder the workers than to 
enlighten them (155). Any formula should in normal years give 
a result which will be of some financial significance to 
workers in relation to their annual wage. To achieve the latter 
object it may be desirable to load the tax exemptions accorded 
to registered profit-sharing schemes in favour of those companies 
which in normal years can average a profit-sharing payout 
equivalent to about two weeks wages a year. 
f. Agreement as the type of scheme 
Integral to the French system is that the method and 
administration of the profit-sharing scheme should be agreed 
upon between the parties (156). The concept of full worker 
awareness, understanding and involvement in the scheme seems 
to be regarded as highly desirable (157) and should therefore 
be embodied in any New Zealand reform in this field. This 
requirement could most conveniently be dealt with by an agreement 
between the parties registered at the Companies Office. Such 
an agreement, if approved as conforming with the requirements 
which are recommended in this section of the paper,should 
(155) See pp.22-24 of this paper 
(156) See p.19 bf this paper. 
(157) "There is widespread agreement that profit-sharing will not 
be fully effective unless the employees are fully 
consulted in the formulation and administration of the plan."-
Profi t Sharing p.25. See also pp.60-62 of this paper. 
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automatically entitle both the firm and its employees to the 
taxation concessions referred to above. No doubt such an 
agreement would have to conform to a provision similar to the 
1953 Regulations under the United States Fair Labour Standards 
Act (158). These regulations require, inter alia, that the 
plan must be a definite written programme communicated or made 
available to the employees and established in good faith for 
the purpose of sharing profits as additional remuneration over 
and above the employee's wage or salary and the latter must 
be independent of the profit-sharing plan. 
g. Tax incentives 
It is considered the best rrethod to successfully implement 
profit-sharing legislation is to encourage profit-sharing 
through tax incentives in favour of those firms and their 
employees who implement approved profit-sharing schemes. An 
approved scheme could be one passed by a body equivalent to the 
French C.E.R.C. (159) provided that it embodies the basic 
various requirements described in this section. Once approved 
and registered the scheme would automatically entitle the company 
and its employees to the tax benefits accorded to profit-sharing. 
What then should these tax benefits be? Firstly it is 
considered that employee's profit-sharing distribution for each 
year should be tax free to a certain maximum level. Although 
( 15 8) Section 7(d) (3) Amendment Act, 1950 
(159) Centre d'Etudes des Revenus et des Couts. For a 
description of the composition and functions of this 
body see pp.26-7 of this paper. 
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it is outside the scope of this paper to specify the exact 
figure this maximum level should be sufficient to act as a 
positive encouragement for profit-sharing schemes, While at the 
same time striking a fair balance with other sections of the 
tax-paying community . (160) 
Secondly, companies should be given some inducement to 
implement schemes. It is however considered that the tax 
exemptions to French companies under the Ordinance of 17 August 
1967 (161) go too far, being a burden which has to be met by 
the rest of the community (162). The United States Internal 
Revenue Code of 19 52 in the writer's opinion, provides us 
with a better example of how to balance the interest of 
encouraging companies to have profit-sharing schemes while on 
the other hand not unduly favouring those companies at the 
expense of the general taxpayer. Thus under the Code the 
employer's contributions to an approved profit-sharing plan 
are deductible as a business expense, up to 15 per cent of 
the annual compensation of the participants (16 3). 
(160) The West German figure of 624DM per annum (about $161.00) 
is probably a useful starting point in determining a 
suitable maximum level of tax exemption. 
(161) See p.24 of this paper. Under Article 8 of the Ordinance 
the whole amount distributed to the employee's special 
participation reserve in each year is deductible from 
that year's taxable profit. 
(162) For Lasserre's strong criticism of the Ordinance on this 
ground see p.42 of this paper. 
( 16 3) The tax advantages of the Code are described at pp. 6 3-6 4 
of this p3.per. 
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h. Worker information and involvement 
Perhaps one of the most socially significant aspects of 
the French reform is the emphasis placed on stimulating the 
worker's personal interest and involvement with the progress of 
his firm. This goal is sought to be achieved by the detailed 
legislative requirements as to the dissemination at regular 
intervals of information on the firm and its profit-sharing 
programme to the workers (164). American experience also 
supports the view that effective communication to employees is 
the life-blood of any profit-sharing scheme and that most of 
the benefits which can be derived from a scheme may be lost if 
workers are not fully informed as to how their efforts will 
contribute to the final result (165). 
The profound social implications in ensuring that workers 
are fully informed about the firm and their role in it is that 
they are thereby treated as thinking and creative human beings 
rather than wage-pursuing automata. As we saw in the previous 
section (166) the pay packet theory is only part of the story 
of worker motivation. Job satisfaction and a sense of 
achievement may be just as important in achieving better 
industrial relations and improved production and efficiency. 
It is therefore recommended that one of the requirements 
for any profit-sharing agreement is that it contains de tailed 
( 16 4) 
(165) 
(166) 
See pp.39-40 of this paper 
See pp.60-62 ibid 
See pp.47-8 ibid 
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provisions to ensure that workers are regularly informed as to 
the functioning of the scheme and the progress of their company.
 
The information should endeavour to show each worker why his 
efforts are important and influence the overa·ll results 
achieved by the company. In this way the stage may be set for 
encouraging employees to better utilise their individual skills 
and resources and thereby derive greater satisfaction and sense 
of achievement from their work. 
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